An Information-Theoretic Approach to Job Quits by Wilde, Louis L.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
AN INFORMATION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO JOB QUITS* 
Louis 1. Wilde 
*I would like to thank Robert Forsythe and Steve Salop for 
helpful discussions of this material. A preliminary version 
of this paper was presented at the 1977 summer meeting of the 
Econometric Society in Ottawa, Canada. 
SOCIAL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 150 
Forthcoming in Studies in the Economics of Search, S. Lippman 
and J. J. McCall (eds. ) , 1979. February 1977 
rev. August 1977 
ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the existence of quits as part of 
optimal job-shopping strategies by imperfectly informed workers. 
Formally this is modeled as a sequential decision problem in 
which jobs are assumed to be described by more than a single 
parameter. These multiple characteristics vary in their respective 
degrees of observability. Along with a characterization of the 
optimal strategy and a proof of the existence of a positive quit 
rate, comparative statics results are obtained. 
AN INFORMATION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO JOB QUITS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Models of job search under imperfect information have 
become a commonplace in the Economics Literature.1 The fundamental 
problem is the following. An unemployed worker desires to work 
but he does not know the characteristics of jobs at different 
firms. He can, however, observe various aspects of jobs by 
investing resources in "search" activity. Typical assumptions 
used in modeling this process are that jobs are identical except 
for wage and that the worker desires to maximize expected income 
net of search costs. In this case, assuming an infinite horizon 
and no discounting, it is easy to show that the optimal policy 




(w - S)f(w)dw, 
s 
where c is the unit cost of search and f is the market distribution 
of wage offers. The decision rule is to accept the first offer 
which exceeds S• Even in this simple setting, a number of useful 
2 predictions stem from (1). In particular, s is inversely related
to c so that workers with higher search costs set lower reservation 
wages, expect to search less to find an acceptable job, and expect 
lower net incomes. 
(1) 
This primitive search model has been extended and 
generalized in many directions. But two issues are of interest 
here. The first concerns modifications in the optimal search 
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strategy introduced when jobs are described by more than a single 
characteristic, the second concerns the role of search theory in 
explaining the existence and nature of job quits as an equilibrium 
phenomenon. 
The first issue has been studied by Rosen [14], for 
example, in the context of tied-sales in product markets. His 
results suggest that as long as all the relevant characteristics 
of a job can be observed prior to any on-the-job experience, 
then the nature of the search strategy is not altered in any 
fundamental way the reservation wage is replaced by a 
reservation frontier which defines the trade-off between minimally 
acceptable bundles of characteristics. However, this conclusion 
is no longer valid if some of the characteristics of jobs are 
"specific" in the sense that they cannot be observed without 
actually working on the job. 
A second problem with the basic search model defined 
above is that it doesn't allow for the possibility of quits. 
Clearly, in that world, if a searching worker finds a job offer 
which exceeds his reservation wage, then he accepts it and never 
quits. The implicit assumption in most search models is that the 
cost of searching while employed is so high as to preclude any 
on-the-job search. Burdett [3] provides a recent exception to 
this rule. 3 
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Burdett allows the worker several possible modes of 
activity; he can search while unemployed, search and work, or work 
and not search at all (of course, the worker can also not work and 
not search, but this is uninteresting). If the cost of search 
while working is not too high relative to the cost of search while 
unemployed, then it pays the worker to set two reservation wages, 
s1 < s2, such that jobs offering wages less than s1 are rejected, 
jobs with wages between s1 and s2 are accepted with search 
continuing, and jobs offering wages above s2 are accepted with 
search activity ceasing altogether. 
Burdett's formulation of the search problem introduces 
the possibility of quits in a framework of imperfect information 
and, assuming workers have finite lifetimes, his results are 
theoretically consistent with the empirical observation that quit 
rates are inversely related to both job tenure and age. These 
kinds of results are important because they provide a foundation 
for the existence of quits as an equilibrium phenomenon, 4 and 
highlight the importance of imperfect information in explaining 
labor market activity. 
An alternative to Burdett's model is to assume that 
some characteristics of jobs are specific; that is, they cannot 
be observed without actually working the job.5 The process of 
learning about such characteristics will be called evaluation. 
Characteristics which can be observed directly (upon paying some 
search cost) will be called general characteristics and those 
which require on-the-job experience will be called specific 
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characteristics, 6 In light of Rosen [14], a single general 
characteristic will suffice. Suppose there are n specific 
characteristics, y1, • • .  ,yn' and suppose further that these must 
be evaluated sequentially. If the sequence of evaluation is 
optimal in an appropriate sense, (roughly, the characteristics 
are observed sequentially in order of importance)7 then quit rates 
decline with job tenure since good observations on early yi's 
(where a good observation is one that does not induce the worker 
to quit) will reduce the likelihood that subsequent observations 
of other specific characteristics will result in a quit. This 
reduction in the probability of quitting reflects a true 
accumulation of knowledge.8 
The next section.of this paper presents a formal model 
of search and evaluation where there is just one, general 
characteristic, the wage rate (w), and one specific characteristic 
(y) associated with jobs. It is established first that the 
worker's problem is well-defined, that an optimal policy exists 
and is unique, and that it is described by a sequential strategy, 
Next it is shown that under reasonable conditions the optimal 
strategy is to set a reservation wage, s, and search sequentially 
until a wage which beats the reservation wage is located. After 
working the job for one period, the specific characteristic 
associated with the (already known) wage is observed and the quit 
decision is made. Associated with the specific characteristic is 
a reservation function, y*(w), which defines acceptable ranges of 
y and ranges of y for which it is optimal to quit and search again. 
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In section 3 it is established that as long as the 
reservation wage is positive then there is a positive probability 
of quitting after taking a job. Section 4 considers changes in the 
optimal strategy when the period of specificity (the time it takes 
to evaluate the specific characteristic) changes, A concluding 
section summarizes the results and suggests some problems for 
further research, 
Although this paper presents a theory of the existence 
of quits which is consistent (at least) with casual observation, 
it should be emphasized that it refutes neither the theoretical 
influence of human capital on the quit rate, nor other theories 
of the existence of quits, For example, it is clear that on-the­
job search is important in explaining some quits, regardless of 
the existence of specific characteristics; Matilla [7] has 
estimated that approximately 60 percent of those who quit already 
have jobs lined up. But the decision to initiate search while 
employed may arise from several sources; it may be part of an 
optimal search strategy (see Burdett [3] or Lippman and McCall 
[5]), it may reflect a career switch point between jobs offering 
different rates of accumulation of human capital (see Rosen [13]), 
or it may be due to a poor outcome in the evaluation of some 
specific characteristic (see Pencavel [11]). While this paper 
considers only search while unemployed, relatively straightforward 
extensions would incorporate cases where employed workers initiate 
on-the-job search as a result of poor observations of some 
specific characteristic. 
II. A MODEL OF SEARCH AND EVALUATION 
2. 1 Basic Assumptions 
Underlying this model is the notion that unemployed 
workers seek jobs but are imperfectly informed as to the 
characteristics of available jobs. Jobs vary with respect to 
both wage and some nonwage characteristic, While ignorant of 
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specific packages of the wage and nonwage characteristic offered 
by specific firms, workers can invest in information. The 
formal structure of this process is defined by the following six 
assumptions. 
Al) Each job is described by a pair (w, y) where w is wage and 
A2) 
y is some nonwage characteristic which cannot be observed 
without working on-the-job for one period; w is observed 
by direct sampling, 
The market distribution of W and Y is defined by a joint 
p.d. f, �(w, y). 2 Assume � is positive on R+. 
Let f(w) and g(y) be the marginal p.d.f. of W and the 
marginal p.d.f. of Y, respectively, and define g(y l w) as
the conditional p.d.f. of Y given W = w. 
A3) Let u(w, y) be the per period utility of working a job 
which pays wage w and possesses nonwage characteristic 
y. Assume u is differentiable and nondecreasing in 
each argument. Assume further that u is bounded. 
A4 ) The cost of drawing an observation from � is c > O. 
Only one firm can be sampled per period, and the worker 
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cannot sample and work simultaneously. Assume c is measured 
in the same units as u(w, y) with E[u(W, Y)] > c, 
A5) The worker's objective is to maximize his discounted 
stream of utility, net of search costs. 
A6) The worker knows � with certainty, sampling is without 
recall, the horizon is infinite, and the discount rate is 
13, 0 < 13 < 1. 
2.2 The Searcher's Problem 
Given the six assumptions of 2.1, it is clear that the 
form of the optimal strategy will be sequential. The searching 
worker's problem is therefore the following. He knows �. By 
paying c he can draw an observation, say (w0, y0), but he only sees 
w0• Information concerning y0 is limited to knowledge of the 
conditional distribution of Y given w0• After observing w0, the 
worker can either accept the job or sample again; he cannot both 
accept the job and draw another observation. If he accepts the 
job he receives u(w0, y0) for as many periods as he stays. 
But 
the worker will not discover that y0 is the true value of Y until 
he has worked for one period. If w0 is high, he may accept the 
job assuming y0 to be the average according to g(y l w0), only to 
discover by the end of the first period of employment that y
0 
is 
very low, for example. If it is low enough, the worker may quit 
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the job and sample again. Consequently, for some values of W it 
may pay to take the job, knowing ahead of time that the probability 
of quitting is nonzero. The optimal policy is thus a kind of 
sequential-lexicographic process whereby the decision whether to 
take the job or not is based on critical values of W and the 
decision whether to stay or quit, obviously conditional on having 
accepted the job, is based on critical values of Y. 
In the absence of any constraints on the distribution 
of w and y there is no a priori relationship between an observed 
wage and the expected per period utility from accepting a job 
paying that wage. In fact, if high wages are strongly correlated 
with low nonwage characteristics, it might pay to reject high 
9 wage offers in favor of low wage offers. In the body of this 
paper enough structure will be imposed on � to guarantee 
that not only are high wages strictly preferred to low (prior to 
the observation of the nonwage characteristic) but, in addition, 
the reservation wage will be unique. In this case the optimal 
strategy is characterized at each stage of the process by a 
number, s, and a function, y*(w), as follows. 
a) if w < s, then sample again 
b) if w > s, then take the job for one period and 
(i) quit and sample again if y < y*(w) 
(ii) keep the job if y 2:_ y*(w). 
(2) 
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2. 3 The Functional Equation 
The searcher's objective is to maximize his discounted 
stream of utility net of search costs. Define v(w) as the expected 
value of the discounted stream of utility, net of search costs, 
generated by pursuing an optimal policy from the current period 
on when w has just been observed. Let V be the expected value 
of v(w) taken with respect to the marginal distribution of w. 
Then 
v(w) -c + (3max{ V; J lu(w, y) + (3max{ui�·�), V} ]g(y i'•)dy}. 
0 
-c + (3max{V ; E [u(w, Y)] + (3[VG(y*(w) j w )
+ J
"'
uiw�yj g(y j w)dy]} 
y*(w) 
where G(y j w) is the c. d. f. associated with g(y j w), y*(w) is defined
by 
and 
u(w, y*(w)) _ v;-o
1- (3 
V = f00v(w)f(w)dw. 
0 
The decision process formalized in (3) is illustrated in figure 1. 
Note that y*(w) is that value of the nonwage characteristic which 
leaves the worker indifferent between keeping a job paying wage w 




define the expected utility of taking a job at wage w to be 
T(w) - E[u(w,Y)] + f3[VG(y*(w) lw) 
+ Joouiw_:�)g(y j w)dy]. 
y*(w) 
The value of a job offering wage w is the sum of the expected 
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utility this period plus the discounted expected utility from the 
next period on into the future. This latter quantity is equal to 
the expected value of search times the probability of quitting 
plus the expected value of keeping the job times the probability 
of not quitting. The effect of assuming y to be a specific 
characteristic is reflected in the second term in (6). That is, 
the expected value of keeping the job conditional on y � y*(w) is
not v(w); there is learning which is specific in the sense that 
it is lost when the worker quits to search. 
(6) 
The immediate problem is to show (3) has a solution. This 
result is straightforward and follows from assumptions (Al) through
(A6). 
Theorem 1: There exists a unique, continuous, bounded solution to 
the functional equation (3). 
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A. 
Given a unique solution to (3), V can be taken as a constant. 
The reservation wage, !;;, is defined by
v T ( s) E[u(E;,Y)] + f3{V G(y*(S) IO 
+ 1�(1;;,y) g(y j f;)dy} 1- f3 
y* <s> 
As it stands, there is no guarantee that s is unique.
There may be intervals of acceptable wages separated by intervals 
of unacceptable wages, or it may be that all wages or no wages are 
acceptable. The next lemma and theorem establish conditions under 
which (1) s is unique and (2) high wage offers are preferred 
systematically to low wage offers. The approach is to find a 
sufficient condition for aT(w)/ow > 0. In this case either all 
wage offers are acceptable (s = 0) or there is a unique s > 0 
such that w < s is rejected but w � s is accepted. The sufficient
condition for aT(w)/aw > 0 puts restrictions on the conditional 
distributions g(. j w) and implicitly on cp. 
Consider an unemployed worker who draws an observation 
of w . He is concerned with the unknown characteristic associated 0 
with w0, but only to the extent that it effects the total utility 
of the job. That is, he is not concerned with the conditional 
distribution g(• J w )  per se. Rather, his decision whether to 0 
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(7) 
accept w0 or to reject it is based upon the conditional distribution
of utility which is induced by g(• J w )  through u(w ,y). Define a 0 0 
random variable Z as the per period utility of a job paying some 
known wage and possessing unknown characteristic y. Let � w( z) be 
the c.d.f. of Z when wage w has been observed, Then a sufficient
condition for aT(w)faw > 0 is that � (z) be stoehastically w . 
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increasing in w. Thus: 
A7) o 'l'w(z)/(lw < 0 for all w > 0.
It is easy to see that (A7) generates a kind of monotonicity with 
respect to a worker's evaluation of wage offers. The only way a 
high wage offer could be rejected in favor of a lower wage offer is 
if the worker believes that the high wage is associated with such 
a low value of Y that the net utility of the high wage job is less 
than that of the low wage job. Assumption (A7) rules out such 
possibilities!l The next lemma formalizes this argument. 
Lemma 1: Under assumptions (Al) through (A7), ClT(w)/Clw > 0 for 
all w>O. 
Proof: From (6), integrating T(w) by parts and differentiating 
with respect to w yields 
z(w) 
dT(w)/ow = -f a'!'w(z)/Clw dz -
z(w) 
(1�8)j Cl'l'w(z)/Clw dz , 
V(l -f3) - 00  
where z(w) = lim u(w,y). 
y+oo 
Thus Cl'l'w(z)/aw < 0 implies ClT(w)/Clw > 0.
Theorem 2: Under assumptions (Al) through (A7), either 
T (w) � V for all w > 0 in which case E; = 0, or there exists a unique 
E; > 0 such that T(E;) = V. Moreover, y*(w) is decreasing in w. 
Proof: First note that lim T(w) > V since otherwise 
w + 00 
v(w) = -c + f3V for all w > 0. In this case V = - _c __ which 1 - f3 




increasing (see Lemma 1), the first part of the theorem follows by 
rewriting (3) as v(w) = -c + f3max{V,T(w)}. Because Clu(w,y)/Cly > 0 
and � > O, inspection of (4 ) reveals that dy*(w)/dw < O.
Since ClT(w)/Clw > O, it must be that wage offers below 
E; are rejected and wage offers above E; are accepted for at least 
one period. Thus, to the extent that optimal behavior after 
accepting any given job is buried in T(w), the optimal policy in 
this problem is analogous to the optimal policy in a simple search 
model. The primary difference is the additional reservation 
function, y*(w), associated with the nonwage characteristic, 
Figure 2 illustrates E; and y*(w). 
2.4 The Optimal Strategy 
Using (6), the functional equation (3) can be written 
v(w) = -c + f3max{T(w),V} 
Noting that w < E; implies T(w) < V and w � E; implies T(w) � V, and 
taking the expectation of v(w) with respect to the marginal p.d.f. 
of w, gives 
v -c + f3{VF(t;) + f00 T(w) f(w)dw}, 
t; 
where F is the c.d.f. associated with f. Rearranging (10) and 
using the relations T(t;) = V and u(E;,y*(t;)) = V (l- f3) yields 





While this expression is not independent of V, it describes the 
logic of the optimal strategy in familiar terms. The value of 
taking a job at w and � is given by T(w) and T(s) respectively. 
The marginal cost of a unit of search is the direct cost c plus 
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the opportunity cost u(s, y*(s» of shifting back the entire stream 
of utility one period when s has been observed (note that the 
opportunity cost is not E[u(s, Y)] but, rather, it is the value of 
working for one period when both margins of indifference, s and 
y*(s), are reached). The right-hand side of (11) is the discounted 
expected return to a unit of additional search when the current 
offer is S (and there is recall). 
In the general model a key comparative statics result 
concerns changes in c. The result is not surprising, but it will 
be useful later for comparison purposes of comparison. 
Theorem 3: <ls/de < O. 
Proof: By definition V = T(s,V). Taking the total derivative, 
� 
= 
av[l- aT11 ClT de Cle Cle Clw 
Now ClV/Clc < o and ClT/ClV SG(y*(w) l w) since ClT/Clw > O. This implies 
dS/dc < O. 
Of course, since an increase in c implies V falls, it must also 
be the case that as c rises, y*(w) falls for any given w; so 
investment in both search and evaluation fall as c rises. The 
probability that a given wage is accepted is [1 -F(s)] . The 
q.e.d. 
15 
probability that a given (w,y) pair is acceptable conditional on 
w > s is
[l -F(s) ]-
l f 00[1 - G(y* (w) lw)] f (w)dw. 
s 
(12) 
As c rises [1 -F(s)] and [1 - G(y*(w) j w)] both increase. Thus, while 
it is true that ex post the quit rate falls, we cannot be sure 
that ex ante the expected probability of a quit falls as c rises. 
III. THE QUIT RATE 
The purpose of this section is to establish some 
relationships between acceptable wages and acceptable values of 
the nonwage characteristic. In particular, it will be shown that 
as long as the reservation wage is interior to the distribution of 
wage offers, then the probability of quitting is strictly positive. 
Theorem 4 :  If s > O, then y*(s) > O. 
Proof: Assume the opposite; let y*(s) = 0. Then by the definition 
of y*(s) given in (4) and footnote 10, we have 
But V 
v < u(s,O) 
1 -S 
T(s), so when y*(s) = 0, 
v T(s) E[u(s,Y)J 1 - f3 
Equations (13) and (14 ) imply u(s,O) ..'.'._ E[u(s, Y)], which is a 






), Therefore y*(s) > 0. 
This theorem establishes that the nonwage characteristic is never 
irrelevant when it pays to differentiate firms by wage, As long as 
s is strictly greater than 0 then at (, and in a neighborhood of it, 
q.e.d. 
it pays to reject some jobs on the basis of the nonwage characteristic. 
Thus after observing y, the probability of a quit G(y*(w) lw) is 
strictly positive for wages near the reservation wage. While this 
is a strong result (it proves the existence of quits as part of an 
optimal job-shopping strategy) it does not say that y*(w) > 0 for 
all wages greater than (. For high enough wage offers it may pay 
to accept any level of y in which case the probability of a quite 
at that wage is zero. 
It should also be pointed out that s = 0 does not imply 
y*(w) = O for all w > O. That is, even if all wage offers are 
acceptable, some levels of the nonwage characteristic may be 
rejected. To see this consider the following example. Assume 
s = O and T(O) = V. Then y*(O) > O. The argument proving this is 
similar to the proof of Theorem 4; by assuming y*(O) = 0 one can 
reach a contradiction. 
Finally, note that Theorem 4 does not rely on (A7). Even 
if there are multiple values of w such that T(w) = V, it remains 
true that at each of them (and in the proper neighborhood of each) 
the probability of a quit is nonzero. 
IV. VARIABLE EVALUATION TIME 
The model analyzed in this paper concerns investment in 
two kinds of information, general and specific. The cost of 
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investment in general information is c, the direct cost of search. 
The cost of investment in specific information is the opportunity 
cost o:I; working for one period at a low u(w,y) level. An increase 
in the cost of general information is simply an increase in c. 
An increase in the cost of specific information is equivalent to 
:forcing the worker to work for more than one period before observing 
y. The purpose of this section is to incorporate such a 
modification into the basic model and then investigate the effects 
of changes in the cost of investment in specific information. 
The modification is fairly straightforward. As before, 
the length of time it takes to generate an offer via search is 
one period, but now suppose it takes s of these periods to evaluate 
the unobservable characteristic y. In general, the worker would 
"learn" about the true value of Y during this initial stage of 
work (observing various random variables and forming expectations 
abQut their distributions), but we abstract from this process by 
fixing the evaluation period and assuming the worker receives 
12 Efu(w,Y).J during each of the first s periods. Hence the only 
formal change in the model is that upon taking a job at wage w the 
worker now expects to receive E[u(w,Y)] for s periods, after which 
i · the J'ob.
13 
he makes a decision with respect to quitting or reta ning 
In the remainder of this section, the variables of the 
model will be indexed by time subscripts or superscripts to 
reflect the period of specificity. Assumptions (Al) through (A7) 
will again be assumed to hold where (Al) is modified to allow for 
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evaluation periods greater than 1. Under these circumstances 
y�(w,Vs) is still defined by (4 ) and ss is unique with wages 
below ss rejected and wages greater than or equal to ss accepted. 
The o.pt.imal. return is now definf'.d by 
vs(w) -c + Smax{T (w),Vs}, s 
where in this case the value of taking a job at wage w is 
and B(s) 
increase in 
T (w)'= E[u(w,Y)]B(s) + S
s{VsG[y*(w)jw] s s 
+ f"'u(w,y) g(yjw)dy} 1 -S 
y�(w) 
� i-1 ls . The first step in analyzing the effects of an
i=l 
s is to show vs> vs+l. That is, as the period of 
specificity increases, the expected utility of optimal search 
falls. 
Lemma 2: For each s _'.'.. 1, vs > vs+l. 
Proof: Let ss+l and y�+l (w) be optimal when evaluation takes s + 1 
periods and let Vs+l be the expected value of search when these 
strategies are used in the (s + 1)-period problem. Consider the 
following new problem: Suppose that the first job which is 
accepted has a nonwage characteristic which can be evaluated in s 
periods but all subsequent jobs require s + 1 periods to evaluate 
the nonwage characteristic. Thus if the first job which is 
accepted results in a quit, the value of optimal search from then 
on out is Vs+l. Define the value of taking a job under these 
(15) 
(16) 
A s+l circumstances as Ts+l(w,V ). Then 
A s+l 
Ts+l(w,V ) 
s{ s+l I E[u(w,Y)] B(s) + S V G[y�+l(w) w] 
+f "' u(w,y) g(yjw)dy}. 1 -S 
y�+l(w)
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s+l The definition of Ts+l(w,V ) given in (16) and the definition of 
y�+l(w) yield
" s+l s+l Ts+l(w,V ) - Ts+l(w,V ) > O. 
Define u1(w) as the expected value of an observation of wage w 
under the above conditions. Then 
1 { s+l " s+l } U (w) = -c + Smax V ,Ts+l(w,V ) 
-1 1 Let U be the expected value of U (w) with respect to the marginal 
p. d. f. of wages, f(w). Then (17) implies u1 _'.'.. Vs+l. Repeat the 
-1 above procedure using U as the value of search but maintaining 
use of the strategies ss+l and y�+l(w). That is, define 
A -1 Ts+l(w,U ) as the value of taking a job at wage w when the first
two jobs can be evaluated in s periods but all subsequent jobs 
take s + 1 periods to evaluate. It is trivial that 
A -1 A s+l 2 -2 Ts+l(w,U ) .'.'.. Ts+l(w,V ). Next define U (w) and U analogously 
to u1(w) and u1. Then if2 > u1• Repeating the process generates 
-1 -2 :::n a sequence U _2 U _2 • • • _2 U _: The limit of this sequence 
represents the case in which all evaluations take precisely s 
periods and the search strategy is characterized by ss+l and
(17) 
Y:+l(w). Clearly this leads to an expected utility of search 
20 
which is less than Vs. 
=:i_ 00 
Thus {U }i=l is nondecreasing and bounded 
above by Vs. Define U* lim U
n then 
ri + 00 
U* < Vs 
Strict inequality derives from the uniqueness of S
S 
and ss+1· 
Lemma 3: For each s _'.".. 1, <lTs(w)/<lw is positive and increasing 
in s. 
Proof: Integrating by parts in (16), using �w(z) as defined 




(w)/dW = - �l� s)f d�W(z)/<lw dz 
-00 
where again z(w) = lim u(w,y), Since <l�z(w)/<lw < 0, <lTs(w)/<lw > 0.y + oo 
Moreover, as s increases, both B
s and Vs (1 - 8) fall, implying the
q. e.d. 
(18) 
second term in (18) gets smaller, Hence <lTs(w)/<lw < <lTs+l(w)/<lw. q. e.d. 
Armed with lemmas 2 and 3, we are prepared to show that 
the reservation wage rises with s. 
Theorem 5: For each s _'.".. 1, ss+l _'."..SS with strict inequality if 
s > o. s 
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Proof: Assume the opposite; that is, let ss > ss+l' In this case 
it must be that 
for all w _'.".. ss+1 · This follows from the fact that when SS > Ss+l 
then Ts(w) - Ts+l(w) is maximal at ss+l 
over w _'.".. ss+l· 
But S
S
_'.".. Ss+l implies this is less than or equal to v
s - v
s+l. 
With oTt (w)/<lw increasing in t, the difference Ts(w) - Ts+l (w) 
s s+l can only get smaller than V - V as w increases above ss+l' 
Equation (19) implies T (w) - V
s < T (w) - Vs+l s s+l 
for all w _'.".. Ss+l' Using (15) as in section 2. 4 generates 
8f 00[Tt(w) - Vt]f(w)dw. 
s
t 
Consider what happens in (20) as t goes from s to s + 1. Vt falls 
t but [Tt(w) - v l rises. Thus st must rise unless SS = 0 = Ss+l' 
implying ss+l _'.".. Ss• This contradicts the original assumption that 
ss+l < Ss· Thus it must be that Ss+l _'.".. Ss· The strict inequality
(19) 
(20) 
obviously holds when ss 
> O. q.e. d. 
Theorem 6: For all w _'.".. O, y:(w) _'.".. Y:+1(w) with strict inequality
if y:(w) > O. 
u(w,y*(w)) 
Proof: By definition 1 :-B 




The implication of Theorems 5 and 6 is that as s rises (the cost of 
evaluation increases) there is a shift away from evaluation toward 
search. Moreover, there is an unambiguous fall in the ex ante 
expected probability of a quit when s increases. This is in 
contrast to the case when c increases. There, while both search 
and evaluation decrease as w* and y*(w) fall,14 we cannot 
guarantee a fall in the� ante expected quit rate a c rises. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this paper has uncovered two strong 
results. The first is that while an increase in direct search 
costs decreases both search and evaluation, an increase in the 
costs of evaluation (a rise in s) causes a shift away from 
evaluation and towards search. The second strong result is that 
as long as wage offers matter (i.e. as long as there exists at 
least one s interior to the distribution of potential wage offers), 
then the quit rate is strictly positive (in a probabilistic 
sense). 
These results forcefully illustrated the importance of 
distinguishing between general and specific information. In 
future research, this distinction will be applied to consumer 
behavior in product markets as well as other problems in labor 
economics. For example, the same sort of analysis can be used 
to explain firm's firing behavior; the initially unobserved 
characteristics of employees also become known after a certain 
period of employment. 
APPENDIX 
This appendix outlines a proof of theorem 1. 
Theorem 1: There exists a unique, continuous, bounded solution 
to the functional equation (3). 
2 
Proof: Since u(w,y) is continuous and bounded on R+ and S 
2 3 
satisfies O < S < 1, a straightforward application of Denardo [4] 
suffices to establish theorem 1. 
A more traditional approach is to define a sequence of 
truncated problems by the functional equations 
-c N-1 f 00 + S max{V ; [u(w,y) 
0 
+ Smax{ u(w ,y)B (N - 1), V N -2}g(y l w)dy}, 
N-1 
where B(N - 1) = l Sn-l, VN is the expected value of \IN (w) according 
n=l 
to f(w), and N � 2. Otherwise v·1(w) = -c and v 0(w) = O. Standard 
arguments show that there exists ( • ) defined on [0,00) such that
{vN} converges uniformly to v, v is the unique solution to (3), 
and is continuous and bounded on [0,00). q.e. d. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The literature on the economics of information, in general, 
and on job search, in particular, has become enormous. A recent 
survey of the latter is provided by Lippman and McCall [5], 
2. This sequential version of the search problem is analyzed
in McCall [8]. A concise summary of its implications is provided 
in Rothschild [16]. Although Rothschild's discussion is set in the 
product market, his model is easily translated into the labor market. 
3. For a similar approach to job quits, see Lippman and McCall 
[5, pp. 179-181]. Also, since the completion of this work, I have 
become aware of two related papers. The first is a comment by George 
Borjas and Matthew Goldberg [2]. They attempt an extension of the 
basic search model which allows jobs to be described by multiple 
characteristics, some of which cannot be observed until after the job 
is taken. However, they do not integrate the possibility of quits into 
their model. Naturally in this case, given suitable assumptions regarding 
the market distribution of characteristics, the fundamental aspects of 
the simple search model are not altered. The second paper is by Dale 
Mortensen [9]. He models worker turnover based on stochastic learning 
of job characteristics, but does not distinguish between specific and 
general information or explicitly incorporate search into his model. 
4 .  There are several explanations for the existence of quits. 
In the classical competitive model, voluntary separations are viewed 
as a response to disequilibrium states of net advantage across jobs. 
In equilibrium, the principle of equalizing differences holds that net 
advantage across all jobs will be the same, so that no worker ever 
has an incentive to quit. 
Human capital theory, as expounded by Becker [l], does not 
explain the existence of quits, but it does suggest that quit rates 
should be inversely related to age and job tenure. For an application 
of human capital theory which does explain the existence of some quits 
as part of an optimal worker strategy see Rosen [13]. 
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Burdett's model provides an alternative to these explanations 
based upon the concept of on-the-job search. As another information­
theoretic alternative, the current analysis formalizes Pencavel's [11] 
observation that "the taking on of a job for a trial period may be the 
optimum method for an individual to discover whether that employment 
suits him. " 
5. For a more complete discussion of specific and general 
information see Wilde [17]. Note, however, that the definition of 
specific characteristic precludes the possibility of a firm informing 
potential employees of the exact nature of a job's nonwage 
characteristics before the worker accepts employment. 
6. The term "evaluation" which is used herein to describe the
process of learning about specific characteristics is borrowed from 
MacQueen [6]. MacQueen's model is not set in the labor market and 
while his "possibilities" are described by multiple characteristics, 
each of the characteristics can be observed by paying a search cost. 
The connection is that if the outcome of the first characteristic 
observed is poor enough, the searcher might choose not to observe the 
second characteristic at all, preferring to draw a new "possibility" 
for evaluation. But MacQueen, like Borjas and Goldberg, does not 
incorporate "turnover" into his model. 
Also, the distinction between specific and general information 
is similar to the distinction Nelson [10] made between "search" goods 
and "experience" goods. However, Nelson's definitions are too strong. 
He defines search goods as goods for which only general characteristics 
matter and experience goods are defined as those for which only specific 
characteristics matter. As the model in section 2 will suggest, these 
definitions are polar cases and Nelson's analysis can be extended to 
intermediate examples. 
7. It turns out that if the order of evaluation of specific 
characteristics is fixed exogenously, then quit rates need not decline 
with job tenure. This is because the worker may be forced to evaluate 
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irrelevant characteristics early in his work experience. If the worker 
is allowed to set the order of evaluation as part of an optimal strategy, 
then one would expect quit rates to be inversely related to job tenure. 
8. This notion is discussed in Pencavel [11) who quotes 
Reynolds [12): "Voluntary mobility is essentially a form of job-shopping 
by workers . .  workers have great difficulty in judging the attractive-
ness of a job by talking it over in the company's employment office. 
The only way to judge it accurately is to work on it for awhile. After 
a few weeks or months of work, one can tell whether the job is worth 
keeping. This explains why quits are most frequent during the first few 
months of service and diminish rapidly after that point." 
9. This model is clearly a "partial partial-equilibrium" model, 
to use Rothschild's term. As such it must suffer the same criticism 
Rothschild [15) leveled against early models of job search: the model 
takes the distribution �•as given. 
10. It is possible u(w, O) that for some w, 
� 
> V. In this case we 
define y*(w) =- O. Hence y*(w) "''o implies u(�, _
Y;(w) > v. 
11. Assumption 7 is satisfied, for example, when W and Y are 
independent. It is also satisfied when the conditional distributions 
g(• l w) are stochastically increasing in w. However, this last condition 
implies that higher wages are on average associated with higher values 
of the nonwage characteristic. Not only is this strong, the classical 
concept of equalizing differences suggests that in equilibrium it 
probably isn't true (see footnote 9). 
12. Alternatively, one might wish to think of s as the length 
of an initial contract (a "probationary" period). In this case Y 
might be observed after one period, but the quit decision postponed 
for s periods. 
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13. Of course it is only E[u(w, Y)] which matters to the worker 
when he decides (before observing Y) whether or not to accept a job 
offering wage w. Moreover, what he actually receives during the 
first s periods of employment is qualitatively irrelevant to the 
quit decision. For example, one variation on this model is to 
assume W is the wage received during an "apprentice" phase and Y is 
the subsequent raise received at the end of s periods. Then 
E[u(w, Y)) =- u(w) during apprenticeship and u(w, y) =- u(w+ y) after 
promotion, 
14. Again, the spirit of Theorems 5 and 6 is preserved even 
if (A7) is dropped. If we define A = {w l T (w) > Vs} as thes s -
"acceptance set, " then Theorem 5 becomes Prob{w £A } < Prob{w £A +l
} 
s - s 
and Theorem 6 holds as stated. 
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